کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969404 | 1479474 | 2010 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study](/preview/png/969404.png)
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants, without altering the performance of stronger entrants. These findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements, which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 94, Issues 9–10, October 2010, Pages 604–611