کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969607 | 1479500 | 2006 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism, a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their first choice. Therefore, parents are given incentives to rank high on their list the schools where the student has a good chance of getting in. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the induced preference revelation game. An important policy implication of our result is that a transition from the Boston mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism would lead to unambiguous efficiency gains.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 90, Issues 1–2, January 2006, Pages 215–237
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 90, Issues 1–2, January 2006, Pages 215–237
نویسندگان
Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sönmez,