کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970059 | 1479478 | 2010 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic delegation and voting rules
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition. A larger majority requirement leads to “conservative” delegation and hence a status quo bias; a poor minority protection does the opposite. Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 94, Issues 1–2, February 2010, Pages 102–113
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 94, Issues 1–2, February 2010, Pages 102–113
نویسندگان
Bård Harstad,