Keywords: D70; D71; D72; Best-worst; Anonymity; Top-bottom non-negativity;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: D71; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Incentive compatible; Deterministic mechanism;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; D78; Responsive; Acceptant; WWARP; Satisficing;
Keywords: C79; D82; D71; Incentive compatibility; Efficiency; Financial constraints; Mechanism design; Impossibility;
Keywords: Secure implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Linear production economy; C72; D51; D52; D61; D71;
Keywords: D71; H82; L31; L32; P13; Cooperative production; Egalitarianism; Meritocracy; Majority voting; Two-stage equilibrium;
Keywords: D60; D70; D71; D81; Preference aggregation; Incomplete preferences; Extended Pareto rule;
Keywords: Economic valuation; Public club goods; Cultural heritage institutions; Public governance; Choice experiments method; H41; Z10; D60; D71;
Keywords: Central bank; Communication; Reports; Text mining; Cluster analysis; D71; D83; E52; E58;
Keywords: C91; D02; D71; I11; I28; Organ donation; Disincentives; Laboratory experiment;
Keywords: D71; G00; Z13; Social network analysis; Financial economics; Coauthorship; Corporate finance;
Keywords: D60; D71; D90; Collective decisions; Intertemporal choice; Time inconsistency; Social discounting;
Keywords: D71; F35; O10; O55; China; Aid; Trade unions; Africa;
Keywords: D60; D71; D90; Collective decisions; Intertemporal choice; Time consistency;
Keywords: G21; M41; M14; D71; D21; Religiosity; Private banks; Risk; Performance; Financial reporting;
Keywords: D71; O12; O17; H41; Cooperation; Lineage networks; Reciprocity; Local public goods; China;
Keywords: D01; D02; D71; Implementation; Rights structures; Nash equilibrium; Monotonicity; Social choice rule;
Keywords: D63; D71; Preference aggregation; Uncertainty; Subjective expected utility; Nash product;
Keywords: D71; C72; Social choice; Restricted domains; Condorcet domains; Single-peakedness; Majority voting; Single-crossing property;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; D78; College admissions; Many-to-many matching; Path independence; Substitutability; Modification; Law of aggregate demand;
Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Social interactions; Preference dynamics; Preference heterogeneity; Social conformity; C90; C91; C92; D03; D71;
Keywords: C71; C72; C78; D71; Endowments-swapping-proofness; Top trading cycles; Strategy-proofness; Housing markets;
Keywords: D71; D81; Strategyproofness; Efficiency; Stochastic dominance; Random serial dictatorship; Maximal lotteries;
Keywords: D44; D61; D71; D82; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Non-quasi-linearity; Minimum price rule; Equilibrium structure; Normal-richness; Common-object-ranking domain; Common-tiered-object domain;
Keywords: C71; C78; D47; D71; Indivisible object; Priority; House allocation; Housing market; Stability; Group strategy-proofness;
Keywords: D61; D71; D83; D84; D52; G18; Social welfare; Heterogeneous beliefs; Spurious unanimity; Speculation; Incomplete markets; Financial regulation;
Keywords: C72; D44; D71; D82; Sequential values; Sharing; Network; Redistribution;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Social stigma; G30; G43; D71;
Keywords: D70; D71; D79; Social choice rule; Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Single-peaked preferences; Single-dipped preferences;
Keywords: C78; C92; D71; D72; Legislative bargaining; Majority rule; Unanimity rule; Risk of breakdown; Experiments;
Keywords: D71; D72; H41; O10; Political economy; Public goods; India;
Keywords: D71; C70; Representative democracy; Vote pairing; Group manipulation;
Keywords: C91; D71; Experiment; Endogenous groups; Coordination; Minimum-effort game;
Keywords: C78; D71; D78; Many-to-many matching; Blocking Lemma; Max-min preferences; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Strategy-proofness;
Keywords: D71; D72; Committees; Information aggregation; Disesteem payoffs;
Keywords: D02; D71; D72; Voting rules; Constitutional design; Strong Nash equilibrium; Rule of k names;
Keywords: D71; D72; D63; Alliance formation; Corruption; Reciprocity; Experiment;
Keywords: C31; D71; D85; I21; Z13; Peer effects; Self-control;
Keywords: C9; D71; D78; H41; Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Approval voting; Single-peakedness; Condorcet winner;
Keywords: D71; C72; C92; Storable Votes; Polarization; Colonel Blotto; Tyranny of the majority; Committees; Voting;
Keywords: D71; D82; J45; Committee decision-making; Adverse selection; Screening; Efficiency wages; Transparency; Career concerns;
Keywords: D47; D71; D82; Implementation; Partial equilibrium; Complementarity; Income effect;
Keywords: C78; D71; D78; Probabilistic assignment; Random serial dictatorship; Strategy-proofness; Ex-post efficiency; Weak envy-freeness; Equal division lower bound;
Keywords: C78; D71; D72; Bargaining; Endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution;
Keywords: Politics of policy innovation; Policy experimentation; Heterogeneous beliefs; Chinese transition; Operation Market-Garden; D71; D78; D81; D83; N44; N45; P20; P21;
Keywords: D82; D71; D02; Budget-balanced mechanisms; Green-Laffont mechanism; Pareto optimal mechanism;
Keywords: J15; D71; Z13; D62; I24; Discrimination; Assimilation; Acting white; Peer effects;
Keywords: D71; D82; Approval voting; Efficiency; Evaluationwise strategy-proofness; Preference-approval; Strategy-proofness;
Keywords: D71; D82; Voting; Mechanism design;
Keywords: D82; D71; D01; Implementation in undominated strategies; Partial honesty; Bounded mechanism; Pareto correspondence;