کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
971916 | 932422 | 2010 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Urban Economics - Volume 67, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 239–247
Journal: Journal of Urban Economics - Volume 67, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 239–247
نویسندگان
Sebastian G. Kessing,