کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972073 932490 2011 5 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings
چکیده انگلیسی

We reconsider the model used by Serrano and Yosha (1993) who were interested in information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected in the original paper and show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete revelation of information which was not the case of the other already identified equilibria of the model.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 61, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 152–156
نویسندگان
,