کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972093 932497 2009 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models
چکیده انگلیسی

The Rubinstein alternating-offers game shows that the threat point in Nash wage bargaining models should be the inside, instead of the outside, option. We provide a new way to implement inside options by explicitly modeling a utilitarian union’s strike payoff. The solution to the dynamic bargaining system resulting from the endogeneity of the inside option can serve as a basis for richer, though still easily applicable, models of wage bargaining that are more in accordance with their game-theoretical underpinnings. The dynamics of the model also provide a theoretical justification for temporarily delayed labor market responses to policy changes.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 57, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 161–176
نویسندگان
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