کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972182 1479748 2014 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
دوطبقه عمودی متمایز با مصرف کنندگان بی اطلاع
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی

We study information disclosure in a vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers. Sellers have private information about the adverse effect of their products, while consumers are unaware of existence of such adverse effect unless they are informed by the sellers. We show that information remains hidden only if information disclosure reduces the size of the market. In such a case, whether information is disclosed depends on the intensity of competition, the difference of the adverse effect between the two sellers, and the timing at which pricing and information disclosure decisions are made.


► Consider a vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers.
► Information disclosure about an adverse effect takes place if the market is fully covered.
► With partial coverage we characterize situations in which disclosure does not take place.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 70, July 2014, Pages 59–67
نویسندگان
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