کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972210 932530 2013 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper examines the managerial incentives of oligopolistic firms with Cournot competition when they have an opportunity to form a coalition for cost reduction. The analysis shows that the introduction of managerial incentives reduces a firm’s incentive to form a coalition. Moreover, a firm that belongs to a coalition has an increased managerial incentive (i.e., it becomes more sales-oriented) as its coalition becomes larger. However, in equilibrium, because of externalities generated from the coalition structure and product market competition, the managerial incentive of a firm in a large coalition can be greater than that of a firm in a grand coalition, while the managerial incentive of a firm in a small coalition can be less than that of a firm under stand-alone production.


► This paper examines managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation.
► Managerial incentives reduce a firm’s incentive to form a coalition.
► Managerial incentives become larger as a coalition becomes larger.
► Equilibrium managerial incentives can be greater than that in a grand coalition because of negative externalities.
► Equilibrium managerial incentives can be smaller than that under stand-alone production because of negative externalities.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 66, Issue 1, July 2013, Pages 33–43
نویسندگان
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