کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972210 | 932530 | 2013 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

This paper examines the managerial incentives of oligopolistic firms with Cournot competition when they have an opportunity to form a coalition for cost reduction. The analysis shows that the introduction of managerial incentives reduces a firm’s incentive to form a coalition. Moreover, a firm that belongs to a coalition has an increased managerial incentive (i.e., it becomes more sales-oriented) as its coalition becomes larger. However, in equilibrium, because of externalities generated from the coalition structure and product market competition, the managerial incentive of a firm in a large coalition can be greater than that of a firm in a grand coalition, while the managerial incentive of a firm in a small coalition can be less than that of a firm under stand-alone production.
► This paper examines managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation.
► Managerial incentives reduce a firm’s incentive to form a coalition.
► Managerial incentives become larger as a coalition becomes larger.
► Equilibrium managerial incentives can be greater than that in a grand coalition because of negative externalities.
► Equilibrium managerial incentives can be smaller than that under stand-alone production because of negative externalities.
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 66, Issue 1, July 2013, Pages 33–43