کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972310 932555 2008 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
چکیده انگلیسی

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TU-games. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that each TU-game has a von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable set. We characterize the collection of von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets. We also show that the farsighted core is either empty or equal to the set of imputations of the game. In the last section, we explore the stability of the Shapley value. The Shapley value of a superadditive game is a stable imputation: it is a core imputation or it constitutes a von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable set. A necessary and sufficient condition for a superadditive game to have the Shapley value in the largest consistent set is given.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 56, Issue 3, November 2008, Pages 303–313
نویسندگان
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