کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972315 | 932555 | 2008 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Voting with preferences over margins of victory
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative, providing a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in [Alesina, Alberto, Rosenthal, Howard, 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge] and the benefit of voting function in [Llavador, Humberto, 2006. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. Social Choice and Welfare 27 (1), 55-81]. Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 56, Issue 3, November 2008, Pages 355-365
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 56, Issue 3, November 2008, Pages 355-365
نویسندگان
Humberto Llavador,