کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972324 | 932560 | 2008 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies communication mechanisms for two players with symmetric single-peaked preferences. The peaks are privately known and drawn from a uniform distribution before the agents take a collective decision. While for the general setting Moulin [Moulin, H., 1980. On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness. Public Choice 35, 437-455.] characterized all strategy-proof mechanisms, much remains to be known in the Bayesian framework. The example consists of a dichotomic mechanism, that yields a strictly higher ex-ante expected utility than the best “min-max” rule. The properties of the mechanism are analyzed, then limits and possible directions for generalization are discussed.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 55, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 1-13
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 55, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 1-13
نویسندگان
Pierre Fleckinger,