کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
9724486 1477374 2005 26 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference
چکیده انگلیسی
The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase output. Thus, absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint's effect, an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 7–8, September 2005, Pages 639-664
نویسندگان
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