کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724486 | 1477374 | 2005 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase output. Thus, absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint's effect, an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 7â8, September 2005, Pages 639-664
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 7â8, September 2005, Pages 639-664
نویسندگان
James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien, Michael G. Vita,