کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724502 | 1477376 | 2005 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the earlier auctions are more likely to participate in later auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 3â4, April 2005, Pages 183-201
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 3â4, April 2005, Pages 183-201
نویسندگان
Dakshina G. De Silva, Thomas D. Jeitschko, Georgia Kosmopoulou,