کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724511 | 1477377 | 2005 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Honest certification and the threat of capture
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: (1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. (2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a natural monopoly. (3) Price competition tends to a monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputation models that favors concentration. This principle implies benefits from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 1â2, February 2005, Pages 45-62
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 1â2, February 2005, Pages 45-62
نویسندگان
Roland Strausz,