کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724512 | 1477377 | 2005 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in experimental duopoly markets
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the relation between technological spillovers and R&D cooperation in a duopoly experiment based on the well-known model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin. For scenarios without and with full spillovers, two noncooperative treatments are run, one without and one with non-binding communication possibilities, and one cooperative treatment, with binding contract possibilities. We find that without technological spillovers, binding R&D contracts are needed for R&D decisions to deviate from the subgame perfect Nash R&D level towards the cooperative level. With full spillovers, the possibility of non-binding cheap-talk may suffice to move closer to R&D cooperation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 1â2, February 2005, Pages 63-82
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 23, Issues 1â2, February 2005, Pages 63-82
نویسندگان
Sigrid Suetens,