کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9726204 | 1478099 | 2005 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A Note on Negligence and Collusion-Proof Liability
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Principals are often held at least partially liable for the accidental harm caused by their agents. If the liability of the principal and agent is contingent on the court's establishment of the agent's negligence, the principal has an incentive to withhold evidence of the agent's negligence. Since the principal is often in the best position to monitor the agent and gather such evidence, this can lead the agent to take insufficient care in avoiding accidents. This paper will show that a collusion-proof liability scheme gives the principal no incentive to withhold evidence and induces the same level of preventive care as strict vicarious liability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2005, Pages 256-263
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2005, Pages 256-263
نویسندگان
Christopher Garmon,