کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972719 | 932669 | 2011 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann–Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 61, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 114–123
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 61, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 114–123
نویسندگان
Shin Kishimoto, Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto,