کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972816 | 932688 | 2007 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bounded rationality and repeated network formation
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide structural properties of the sequences of networks which are likely to form in Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game. For instance, players can form totally different connected networks at each period or the sequence of networks can exhibit a total order relationship.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 54, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 71-89
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 54, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 71-89
نویسندگان
Sylvain Béal, Nicolas Quérou,