کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9731463 | 1480484 | 2005 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Adherence to environmental law: the strategic complementarities of compliance decisions
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we address why firms comply with environmental regulations when enforcement is weak by suggesting that firms choose their level of environmental compliance strategically. Our theoretical model shows that compliance decisions among firms are strategic complements-increased compliance by one firm will positively influence the compliance rate of its rival. In our empirical analysis we find that the compliance rates of other regulated entities have a positive and significant effect on a regulated source's compliance behavior in three of our four heavily regulated industries. If compliance decisions are strategic complements, this may partially explain high compliance rates in the presence of limited regulatory pressure.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance - Volume 45, Issues 4â5, September 2005, Pages 641-661
Journal: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance - Volume 45, Issues 4â5, September 2005, Pages 641-661
نویسندگان
Christopher S. Decker, Christopher R. Pope,