کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
973307 932794 2009 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods
چکیده انگلیسی

We examine farsighted stable sets in a public good provision game where the public good is perfectly “lumpy” as defined by Taylor [Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. In this case, Taylor argues that the game is not a prisoners’ dilemma game. While Suzuki and Muto [Suzuki, A., Muto, S., 2005. Farsighted stability in an nn-Person Prisoner’s dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 431–445] have shown that almost all outcomes included in a farsighted stable set of a prisoners’ dilemma game are Pareto efficient, we show in our game that almost all strictly individually rational outcomes are included in a farsighted stable set, including those that are not Pareto efficient.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 58, Issue 1, July 2009, Pages 98–109
نویسندگان
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