کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
982222 | 1480454 | 2012 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

The aim of this article is to test the relationship among organizational architecture, joint liabilities contracts, and loan conditions. Based on a sample of 135 MFIs rated between 2003 and 2008, the study shows that solidarity lending and a decentralized credit decision have no significant influence on loan conditions. Being a village bank lender is significantly associated with higher interest rates charged, higher outreach, lower depth of outreach, and higher transaction costs. Results seem to highlight the existence of a trade-off between outreach and the average loan size per borrower when MFIs decentralize credit decisions or establish joint liability contracts.
► The relationship between credit risk management devices and loan contract terms is studied.
► Credit decision decentralization and solidarity lending do not modify loan contract terms.
► Being a village bank lender is significantly associated with loan contract terms.
► There is a trade-off between outreach and the average loan size when MFIs set-up credit risk management devices.
Journal: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance - Volume 52, Issue 4, November 2012, Pages 427–437