کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
983543 934028 2009 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?
چکیده انگلیسی

Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements even under a “best case” scenario (teams that rapidly develop strategic play in games of this sort), it implies that one must rely on learning models, and past empirical research with these models, when predicting equilibrium outcomes.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Research in Economics - Volume 63, Issue 4, December 2009, Pages 216–224
نویسندگان
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