Durability choice with differentiated products

In a two-period setting we explore the impact of a related non-durable good or service on a monopolists’ choice of product durability. We show that a renting firm will provide the social efficient cost-minimizing durability independent of the related non-durable product. Thus Swan’s [Swan, P., 1970. Durability of consumption goods. American Economic Review 60, 884–894; Swan, P., 1971. The durability of goods and the regulation of monopoly. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 347–357] market independence result can be extended to include durable goods renters that manufacture related non-durables. This finding, however, does not extend to sales markets. With sales, the monopolist will practice planned obsolescence (manufacture goods with uneconomically short lives). We find that planned obsolescence is maximized when the related output is highly complementary with the durable good. This indicates that in durable products markets, such as the electronics industry, public policies that encourage the adoption of complements for the durable may well lead to a less efficient durability choice.