کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
984384 934246 2010 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines an endogenous-timing mixed model, where a public firm competes against a foreign private firm. Each firm first chooses the timing for adopting a wage-rise contract as a strategic instrument. The following situation is considered. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses the stage in which it adopts a wage-rise contract, namely either stage 2 or stage 3. In the second stage, the firm choosing stage 2 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. In the third stage, the firm choosing stage 3 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its output. The paper discusses the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed model.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Research in Economics - Volume 64, Issue 2, June 2010, Pages 121-127
نویسندگان
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