کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
984723 934356 2006 13 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly
چکیده انگلیسی
The paper considers a simple oligopoly model where firms know their own and the average pay-off in the industry. Firms choose decision rules for trading. The theory predicts that there are three types of Nash equilibria in this game (collusive, Cournot and Stackelberg). Our experiments test the selection process. We find that there is clear evidence of convergence to an equilibrium, and whilst both Cournot and collusive outcomes were selected, the collusive equilibrium is more common. The experimental results also give insights into the process of individual learning, confirming that subjects follow aspiration rules rather than reinforcement rules.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Research in Economics - Volume 60, Issue 3, September 2006, Pages 155-167
نویسندگان
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