کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
986427 | 1480830 | 2009 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Fashion statement
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study bilateral matching under private information about agents' characteristics. Assortative matching is the only equilibrium outcome in the absence of private information. When an information friction is present, the matching process can be improved if a payoff-irrelevant variable which we term “fashion” is introduced. Informed agents choose to adopt fashion as a signaling device. If success in matching is observed, other agents can imitate the signal. Thus, for fashion to be useful, it must constantly change. If there are more than two types of agents, both “high” and “low” fashion are needed to facilitate assortative matching.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics - Volume 12, Issue 4, October 2009, Pages 668-677
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics - Volume 12, Issue 4, October 2009, Pages 668-677
نویسندگان
Ted Temzelides,