کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
986460 1480843 2006 28 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Credibility and endogenous societal discounting
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Credibility and endogenous societal discounting
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of committed planners who discount the future less heavily than agents. Thus, we provide micro-foundations for dynamic moral hazard models that assume a societal discount factor in excess of the private one. We extend the analysis to allocations that are reconsideration-proof in the sense of Kocherlakota [Kocherlakota, N., 1996. Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency. Games and Economic Behavior 15, 33–54]. We show that these allocations solve the choice problem of a committed planner with a unit discount factor.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics - Volume 9, Issue 3, July 2006, Pages 410–437
نویسندگان
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