کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
986794 | 1480921 | 2007 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
Additional gold can be made available either by mining at high cost (approximately $250 per ounce in 1997 dollars) or by mobilizing government stocks at zero cost. Governments own massive above-ground stocks but loan out only a small percentage of these stocks. Making all government gold available for private uses immediately through some combination of sales and loans maximizes total welfare from private uses, a consequence of the first welfare theorem. We simulate a calibrated version of our model to quantify the effects of liquidating government stocks on alternative dates. If governments sell immediately rather than never, total welfare increases by $340 billion; if they make an unanticipated sale in 20 years, $105 billion of that amount is lost. By depressing prices, such sales benefit depletion and service users but injure private owners of stocks above and below-ground. However, the injury to above-ground stock owners is more than offset by the benefits to service users—often the same individuals. Mine owners would be the principal losers; however, they could be compensated (twice over) from government sales revenue without any need for tax increases.
Journal: Review of Financial Economics - Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 235–258