کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
987008 1480827 2010 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multi-player bargaining with endogenous capacity
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Multi-player bargaining with endogenous capacity
چکیده انگلیسی

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models of equilibrium search with multilateral matching, and offers a rationale for the adoption of single-unit auctions with fixed reservation price.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics - Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2010, Pages 637–653
نویسندگان
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