کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9953024 | 1477047 | 2018 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
دینامیک چشم انداز و تسلط از دست دادن
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game. When an agent revises her strategy, she compares the payoff from each strategy to a reference point. Under the resulting dynamics, called prospect dynamics, risk-dominance is no longer sufficient to guarantee stochastic stability in 2â¯Ãâ¯2 coordination games. We propose a stronger concept, loss-dominance: a strategy is loss-dominant if it is risk-dominant and a maximin strategy. In 2â¯Ãâ¯2 coordination games, the state where all agents play the loss-dominant strategy is uniquely stochastically stable under prospect dynamics for any degree of loss-aversion and all types of reference points. For symmetric two-player normal form games, a generalized concept, generalized loss-dominance, gives a sufficient condition for stochastic stability under prospect dynamics.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 112, November 2018, Pages 98-124
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 112, November 2018, Pages 98-124
نویسندگان
Ryoji Sawa, Jiabin Wu,