The price of anarchy in competitive reverse supply chains with quality-dependent price-only contracts

• The efficiency of RSCs with quality-dependent price-only contracts is quantified.
• The impact of horizontal competition on RSC efficiency is quantified.
• The impact of push or pull configuration on RSC efficiency is characterized.
• The effect of consumers’ return behavior on RSC efficiency is analyzed.
• The effect of the quality levels of used products on RSC efficiency is quantified.

To quantify the efficiency of decentralized competitive reverse supply chains (RSCs) with quality-dependent price-only contracts, we characterize the worst-case efficiency loss with the price of anarchy (PoA). Several scenarios with unilateral or bilateral horizontal competition under push or pull configurations of RSCs are discussed. Given the uncertainty in the returns of used products, we consider different consumers’ return behaviors and investigate the effect of the quality levels of used products. We clarify the effect of horizontal competition for each scenario and find distinctive features of RSCs that differentiate them from traditional forward activities. Additional managerial insights are provided for discussion.