Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios

• We study the delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions of make-to-order duopoly.
• We explore the interactions between channel structure decision and the price-leadtime decisions.
• We identify the conditions of asymmetric/symmetric channel structure equilibrium.
• Both firms use decentralization when leadtime cost and price elasticity are small.
• The effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on the pricing power scenario.

We develop game-theoretic models to explore the quoted delivery leadtime, price, and channel structure decisions for a make-to-order duopoly system under three game scenarios. Under the integrated-manufacturer first scenario, we find that (i) decentralization of the supply chain increases quoted leadtime; and (ii) both manufacturers may choose different channel structures under symmetric duopoly. By comparing with the symmetric scenario and the retailer first scenario, we find that a manufacturer facing a decentralized rival adopts decentralization when leadtime sensitivity, leadtime cost, and price elasticity are very small; the effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on game scenario.