Empiricists are from Venus, modelers are from Mars: Reconciling experimental and computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience

We describe how computational models can be useful to cognitive and behavioral neuroscience, and discuss some guidelines for deciding whether a model is useful. We emphasize that because instantiating a cognitive theory as a computational model requires specification of an explicit mechanism for the function in question, it often produces clear and novel behavioral predictions to guide empirical research. However, computational modeling in cognitive and behavioral neuroscience remains somewhat rare, perhaps because of misconceptions concerning the use of computational models (in particular, connectionist models) in these fields. We highlight some common misconceptions, each of which relates to an aspect of computational models: the problem space of the model, the level of biological organization at which the model is formulated, and the importance (or not) of biological plausibility, parsimony, and model parameters. Careful consideration of these aspects of a model by empiricists, along with careful delineation of them by modelers, may facilitate communication between the two disciplines and promote the use of computational models for guiding cognitive and behavioral experiments.