کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10474346 928536 2005 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
چکیده انگلیسی
Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 124, Issue 2, October 2005, Pages 129-148
نویسندگان
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