کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10474481 | 928554 | 2005 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Matching markets with adverse selection
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quart. J. Econ. 90 (1976) 629). The major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open-ended and constantly refilled by new participants, e.g., by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market. The major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable, which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts. As frictions become small, we show that the least-cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome, regardless of the distribution of types among entrants. Moreover, we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 121, Issue 2, April 2005, Pages 145-166
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 121, Issue 2, April 2005, Pages 145-166
نویسندگان
Roman Inderst,