کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10474486 | 928554 | 2005 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one. This contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 121, Issue 2, April 2005, Pages 259-272
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 121, Issue 2, April 2005, Pages 259-272
نویسندگان
Martin W. Cripps, Eddie Dekel, Wolfgang Pesendorfer,