کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10477055 | 930126 | 2005 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic trade and delegated competition
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2005, Pages 215-231
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2005, Pages 215-231
نویسندگان
Nolan H. Miller, Amit Pazgal,