کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10477401 | 930300 | 2005 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Erratum to Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO-nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity-preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 67, Issue 2, December 2005, Pages 268-294
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 67, Issue 2, December 2005, Pages 268-294
نویسندگان
Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger,