کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10479908 | 932408 | 2005 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the efficiency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable effort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer's profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee's gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee's rent.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 12, Issue 6, December 2005, Pages 727-738
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 12, Issue 6, December 2005, Pages 727-738
نویسندگان
Patrick W. Schmitz,