کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10479912 | 932408 | 2005 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Firms' investments in general training and the skilled labour market
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
An adverse selection model is analysed, where firms can train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium, the market wage is determined by supply and demand. The quality of the supplied skilled labour is negatively biased, because workers stem from firms that shut down and from firms that observed their trainee's bad quality during the training. If fewer firms were to shut down, then the supplied average quality deteriorates and the incentive to train increases. The incentive is inefficient, because firms must share the informational rent and they free-ride. Ex ante workers may wish to increase the firms' bargaining power.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 12, Issue 6, December 2005, Pages 781-805
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 12, Issue 6, December 2005, Pages 781-805
نویسندگان
Anette Boom,