کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10491523 | 939724 | 2005 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Obtaining R&D Joint Venture Co-operation Under Prisoners' Dilemma Incentives:
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Obtaining R&D Joint Venture Co-operation Under Prisoners' Dilemma Incentives: Obtaining R&D Joint Venture Co-operation Under Prisoners' Dilemma Incentives:](/preview/png/10491523.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
A subset of all R&D joint ventures is characterized by actions and payoffs most similar to a Prisoners' Dilemma game. Firms may cooperate or defect in the venture. When it is unfeasible to obtain independent verification of the venture inputs and outcome, then the dominant solution to the Prisoners' Dilemma - mutual defection - results. This paper proposes the use of a new revelation mechanism that truthfully determines whether defection has occurred in order to trigger penalties. Cooperation results. A simplified version of the solution is tested experimentally and shows a significant improvement in cooperation level results.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Management Journal - Volume 23, Issue 5, October 2005, Pages 520-532
Journal: European Management Journal - Volume 23, Issue 5, October 2005, Pages 520-532
نویسندگان
Richard Arend,