Market signals and relative preference: the moderating effects of conflicting information, decision focus, and need for cognition

In two experiments, we assess how consumers react to competing signals of service quality by having participants compare a certified repair facility with a shop offering a warranty. Experiment 1 shows that consumers (1) associate superior tangible quality with the certified shop, (2) ascribe the certification's power to its dissipative nature, and (3) anticipate that they would be more disappointed with the certified seller for false signals. Experiment 2 shows that the certifications' perceived superiority is moderated by the consumer's need for cognition (NFC), decision focus (promotion or seeking gains, versus prevention or avoiding losses), and negative (conflicting) market information about the sellers. We find that certifications appeal most to promotion-focused higher-NFC consumers when their only option is a limited warranty and, conversely, certifications appeal least to prevention-focused lower-NFC consumers as long as they can get extended warranties. Implications of the results are discussed.