کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10493659 | 940439 | 2005 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Determinants of signaling by banks through loan loss provisions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This study investigates whether bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions (LLP) to convey information about their banks' future prospects. Bank managers' propensities to signal their private information vary cross sectionally because they face different conditions and have different incentives. This study hypothesizes that the propensity to signal varies negatively with bank size and positively with earnings variability, future investment opportunities, and degree of income smoothing. The empirical evidence supports these predictions. It suggests that the propensity to signal is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry and that bank managers attenuate perceived undervaluation of their banks by communicating their private information about their banks' favorable future prospects.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 58, Issue 3, March 2005, Pages 312-320
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 58, Issue 3, March 2005, Pages 312-320
نویسندگان
Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Dong-Hoon Yang,