کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1052062 | 946371 | 2010 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
علوم اجتماعی
جغرافیا، برنامه ریزی و توسعه
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چکیده انگلیسی
Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in international agreements – a domain that might typically be considered within the purview of the executive branch. Through a cross-national analysis and brief case studies, we show that countries with electoral systems that encourage personal vote seeking are more likely to negotiate exceptions to treaties meant to liberalize their investment environments. Legislators benefit by being able to claim credit for having protected their constituents from the competition an unrestricted agreement would entail.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 29, Issue 2, June 2010, Pages 221–226
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 29, Issue 2, June 2010, Pages 221–226
نویسندگان
Brian F. Crisp, Nathan M. Jensen, Guillermo Rosas, Thomas Zeitzoff,