کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
1142647 957159 2013 6 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pay-to-bid auctions: To bid or not to bid
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات گسسته و ترکیبات
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Pay-to-bid auctions: To bid or not to bid
چکیده انگلیسی
We propose an all-pay auction format with risk-loving bidders paying a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge among the bidders, and bidding fees are the only source of benefit for the seller. We characterize a unique symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium, and further show that the expected revenue of the seller is independent of the number of bidders, decreasing in the sale price and bidding fee, and increasing in the value of the object.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Operations Research Letters - Volume 41, Issue 5, September 2013, Pages 462-467
نویسندگان
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