Test MaxEnt in social strategy transitions with experimental two-person constant sum 2 × 2 games

Using laboratory experimental data, we test the uncertainty of social state transitions in various competing environments of fixed paired two-person constant sum 2 × 2 games. It firstly shows that, the distributions of social strategy transitions are not erratic but obey the principle of the maximum entropy (MaxEnt). This finding indicates that human subject social systems and natural systems could share wider common backgrounds.

► By using laboratory two person constant sum experimental game data, social dynamical behaviors are investigated.
► We find the social dynamical observable — social strategy transitions — are not erratic but governed by MaxEnt.
► In all of the games, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are different, however, the social strategy transitions obeying MaxEnt are indifferent.
► This finding indicates that human subject social systems and natural systems could have wider common backgrounds.