کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
4499735 1319046 2006 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The evolution of n-player cooperation—threshold games and ESS bifurcations
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The evolution of n-player cooperation—threshold games and ESS bifurcations
چکیده انگلیسی

An evolutionary game of individuals cooperating to obtain a collective benefit is here modelled as an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. With reference to biological situations, such as group foraging, we introduce a threshold condition in the number of cooperators required to obtain the collective benefit. In the simplest version, a three-player game, complex behaviour appears as the replicator dynamics exhibits a catastrophic event separating a parameter region allowing for coexistence of cooperators and defectors and a region of pure defection. Cooperation emerges through an ESS bifurcation, and cooperators only thrive beyond a critical point in cost-benefit space. Moreover, a repelling fixed point of the dynamics acts as a barrier to the introduction of cooperation in defecting populations. The results illustrate the qualitative difference between two-player games and multiple player games and thus the limitations to the generality of conclusions from two-player games. We present a procedure to find the evolutionarily stable strategies in any n-player game with cost and benefit depending on the number of cooperators. This was previously done by Motro [1991. Co-operation and defection: playing the field and the ESS. J. Theor. Biol. 151, 145–154] in the special cases of convex and concave benefit functions and constant cost.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 238, Issue 2, 21 January 2006, Pages 426–434
نویسندگان
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