کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
480186 1446088 2012 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer–retailer channels
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer–retailer channels
چکیده انگلیسی

The problem of establishing efficiency in a manufacturer–retailer channel (channel coordination) is extensively discussed in the industrial economics, the marketing and the operations research literature. However, studies considering consumer demand to be simultaneously affected by price and non-price variables are scarce. One subset of models investigates efficient contracts with non-linear tariffs, but requires mechanisms which are rarely observed in managerial practice. The other subset analyses channel efficiency effects of alternative royalty payments, but omits to design an efficient contract. We contribute to this literature by investigating a contract of royalty payments that is sufficient for channel coordination. Based on the analysis of the underlying vertical externalities, we show that channel coordination requires cost and revenue sharing via a revenue sharing rate and marketing effort participation rates on both manufacturer and retailer level. Some surprising findings are highlighted: there exists a continuum of efficient contracts. Efficiency requires a retailer’s participation of at least 50% in the manufacturer’s cost of marketing effort. Moreover, the elimination of double marginalisation is not necessary for channel coordination. Manufacturer and retailer can choose an efficient contract via bargaining over the wholesale price. The main challenge for managers will be to create acceptance of new types of royalty payments based on a trustful manufacturer–retailer relationship. We also discuss the cases of the Apple iPhone market launch and of innovative restaurant franchising to further illustrate and underline the relevance of our results.


► Channel coordinating contracts are designed that require cost and revenue sharing.
► Channel members can choose a contract via bargaining over the wholesale price.
► A retailer’s participation in the manufacturer’s marketing effort is mandatory.
► The acceptance of such a payment is the main challenge for managers.
► Model applications are Apple’s iPhone and innovative restaurant franchising.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 216, Issue 2, 16 January 2012, Pages 477–486
نویسندگان
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