کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
4942030 1436980 2017 50 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Iterative voting and acyclic games
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
رأی گیری حقیقی و بازی های حسی
کلمات کلیدی
رأی اعتقادی، آسیکلریت، همگرایی، تعادل نش،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر هوش مصنوعی
چکیده انگلیسی
In more detail, our main technical results provide a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges from any state and for any order of agents, under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and that (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but there is always some path of better replies from any initial state of the game to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between order-free acyclicity and weak acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [7]. In addition, we refute another conjecture of Kukushkin regarding strongly acyclic voting rules, by proving the existence of strongly acyclic separable game forms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Artificial Intelligence - Volume 252, November 2017, Pages 100-122
نویسندگان
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